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Debates in the Digital Humanities
formerly known as Humanities
Computing
by Roberto Simanowski and Luciana
Gattass
2017-03-05
In a review that addresses (and exposes) thefounding myth of the “digital humanities”(DH), formerly known as “humanitiescomputing,” Roberto Simanowski and LucianaGattass measure just how much the 99 articlescollected by Mathew Gold and Lauren Klein haveoverturned “academic life as we know it.”
Soon it’ll be ten years since William Pannpacker, official blogger
for the Chronicle of Higher Education and commentator of the
2009 Modern Language Association’s annual convention
famously proclaimed the Digital Humanities “the next big
thing.” The last decade saw many gatherings, many articles
written with DH in mind, many tweets – because the “big thing”
also constitutes itself via small texts – and various collections of
essays defining what DH is and what it is not. Notable among
these is Matthew K. Gold’s 2012 Debates in the Digital
Humanities whose second installment appeared in 2016. Both
volumes, with 49 and 50 contributions respectively, gather
discussions on how “in a moment of crisis, the digital
humanities contributes to the sustenance of academic life as we
know it, even as (and perhaps because) it upends academic life
as we know it” (Gold, IXf.). They wonder how wide the “big tent”
of DH should be, how much theory DH needs and how much of
a homo faber digital humanists ought to be, whether their
penchant for Twitter trivializes DH’s professional discourse,
whether the link to corporations compromises its academic
nature, how the more “technical” and “positivist” work of DHers
should count towards tenure and promotion, and to what extent
the whole thing is nothing more than computer scientists’
attempt to take over the humanities.
Though the last notion may sound like a conspiracy theory, the
founding myth of “the ‘digital humanities’ (DH), also known as
‘humanities computing’ ” (Kirschenbaum, 3) fully justifies it.
According to the famous anecdote (that is relayed by Kathleen
Fitzpatrick and shared several times in the book) about its
origins, the term DH was initially offered as a marketing ploy
since “A Companion to Humanities Computing,” that Susan
Schreibman, Ray Siemens, and John Unsworth edited with
Blackwell Publishing in 2004 just didn’t sound appealing
enough, and neither did the alternative: “A Companion to
Digitized Humanities.” The results are well known: adjective
and noun traded places, computing in the name of the
humanities became humanities done with computers; the use of
computers in the work of librarians and linguists eventually
became the new thing that now seems to fall victim to its own
success: Everybody wants to be in that club.
That is why nobody knows how to define the DH: or rather, too
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many people have their own particular version, each more or
less backed up lexically, historically, or conceptually. The merit
of Gold’s book is to present the various perspectives on what DH
is and diverse examples of its praxis and problems in/for
research, pedagogy and academic politics. It is an honorable
undertaking, an indispensable and revealing book. Rather than
commenting on the results on a contribution by contribution
basis, we find it more productive to underline some central
issues of the DH that the two installments address and answer.
Digital Marxist Victorianists
The most democratic and anarchistic way of taking part in a
movement is by joining it. Participate in the “Day of DH” on
April 8th and you are in. At a bare minimum your description of
your April 8th is added to the “picture of what it is that DH
scholars actually do” (Parry, 429). Never mind the fact that you
are more likely to come across less entries by scholars than by
undergraduates advertising their YouTube-show or asking for
help with an assignment. This only demonstrates the inclusive,
embracing, and expansive nature of this movement – and may
already point to a problem addressed in the second installment
of the collection, where Ted Underwood questions the ideals
“openness” and “connection” and prefers to see the academic
community as Gesellschaft, “guided mostly by individual aims,
restrained and organized by formal institutions,” rather than as
a Gemeinschaft, “bound together by personal contact among
members and by shared values” (2016, 520). There can be “too
much connection,” Underwood warns, and worries that social
networks – he thinks especially of Twitter – might lure
“humanists into attempting a more cohesive, coercive kind of
Gemeinschaft than academic social networks can (or should)
sustain” (2016, 521).
The issue of membership is entangled with that of definition; the
broader this, the bigger that. According to Dave Parry the most
frequently used words in the contributions to DH-day 2011 were
“research, design, project, data, text … and tool(s)” (430).
Parry’s conclusion to his empirical study – “digital humanities is
largely, or primarily, about using computing technologies as
tools to do traditional humanities-based research” – is in line
with the syntactical structure that the term “digital” attributes to
the “humanities” (432). However, when the “digital” is
compared with other adjectives as in “feminist humanism” or
“Marxist humanities scholarship” things get complicated: Is
“digital” the replacement for “feminist”? Could there also be
feminist humanities with digital tools? Are all branches and
approaches in the humanities digital now?
When Parry states that there is no “nondigital humanities,”
since no humanist can work (read, write, communicate) without
the digital – “Almost all scholars at this point use computers
rather than typewriters and use e-mail to converse with
colleagues dispersed around the globe.” (432) – one may want to
refute with Kathleen Fitzpatrick’s remark that not “every
medievalist with a website” is a DHer (14). To be sure, Parry is
well aware of this and aims, as his subsequent arguments make
clear, higher than it may appear. To him, neither is there no
nondigital humanities, because digital media have an effect on
all forms of human life: “The digital changes what it means to be
human and by extension what it means to study the
humanities.” (436) Against this background, the scholar
applying a text mining program to read Jane Austen’s Pride and
Prejudice or Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature may be even
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less of a DHer than one pondering in front of her class about the
social implications of Facebook’s “culture of transparency.”
Parry himself hints at this notion when he favors “humanities-
based research into the digital” over digitally enhanced
humanities research and regrets that “the dominant type of DH
[using digital media as tools] privileges the old [subjects] at the
expense of the new [turning digital media into a medium of
study]” (434). DH, Parry concludes, “can be something more
than text analysis done more quickly” (434). However, the
question is not how “scholarship that counts word occurrence in
Jane Austen’s texts” can also take into account the cultural
implications of digital media. Rather, it is who does if
Victorianists are busy with their objects from the past?
DH and New Media Studies
Even though the history and the grammar of the term Digital
Humanities points to humanities done with digital media, the
study of digital media is not left out of the equation. Parry calls
it the “media studies version of the digital humanities” (434). In
his essay “What Is Digital Humanities and What’s It Doing in
English Departments?” Kirschenbaum lists as one of the reasons
why English departments are good places for the DH “the
openness of English departments to cultural studies, where
computer and other objects of digital material culture become
the centerpiece of analysis” and refers to Doing Cultural
Studies: the Story of the Sony Walkman by Paul du Gay and
others (9).
Those who are on Parry’s and Kirschenbaum’s side may wonder
how to read the position of the Office of the Digital Humanities
for the National Endowment for the Humanities represented in
the collection by a short interview with its director Brett Bobley.
While Bobley uses DH as an “umbrella term” which, aside from
tool development, data mining, preservation, and visualization,
also includes “media studies” and the “study of the impact of
technology on numerous fields” (61), his reassurance that
“digital scholarship doesn’t have to mean nontraditional,” i.e.
“you can tackle ‘traditional’ humanities topics and questions
while still using the latest digital tools” (64) may raise eyebrows.
Revealing as well is the example Bobley provides of how
technology has changed cultural interaction.
Bobley refers to how digital media have altered the ways in
which we experience music – in terms of access (overcoming the
regional borders), production and distribution (everyone can
produce and distribute their own music), and consumption
(digital files allow you to carry your entire library with you) –
and adds: “Now let’s look at these three areas again (Access,
Production, and Consumption) but in the context of humanities
scholarship. What do humanists do?” (62). Humanists, the
answer goes, digitize material to make it accessible everywhere
via the Web, they make their own work available online to the
entire world, they read on the Web, on laptops, and mobile
devices. There would be nothing wrong with this account were it
not for the fact that here scholars, rather than studying the new
technology, mimic it; they do not discuss the cultural
implications of the changes listed, they carry out these changes
themselves.
Of course, the study of digital media itself is still somewhat part
of the list of what constitutes the DH but, as the short interview
reveals, it is certainly not at the center. This may be due to the
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fact that Bobley himself is “not a scholar” but a “government
grant maker and technologist” who looks for projects that
“demonstrate how technology can be brought to bear on a
humanities problem” rather than address the problems
technology may bring to humanity (64; 65). The deeper reasons
for the social implications of digital technologies not receiving
due attention, some say, may be political and psychological, and
have to do with the difference between affirmative media use
and the trouble of cultural criticism.
Neoliberalization of Higher Education
“The dark side of the digital humanities” is how Richard Grusin,
who organized the eponymous panel at the MLA convention
2013, and others have referred to the unspoken, understated, or
under-theorized economic and political issues behind the DH.
Grusin assumes a correlation between the emergence of the DH
and the neoliberalization and corporatization of higher
education. To him the focus on “making things” rather than
undertaking cultural criticism can be explained by the
“neoliberal insistence that the value of higher education must be
understood instrumentally in economic terms”; the problem is
that university administrators and state legislators see as the
role of higher education “to train students for jobs not to read
literature or study culture” (2016, 499).
In the same critical spirit, and as a result of the same MLA-
panel, Rita Raley claims that, against “our current mercantile
knowledge regime,” that the DH must not focus on
“administrative and public demands to make knowledge useful,”
and should jolt out “of the cycle of innovating for the next grant
cycle” so as to develop a measured skepticism towards the
affordances of digital media “that might serve as a buffer against
the irrational exuberance that too-often characterizes the
framing of our projects, initiatives, and entrepreneurial efforts.”
(2016, 506f.) Among the constraints Raley implicitly invokes are
the terms of use the university signs when accepting the IT
services of Microsoft, Google and Co, and the protocols that
govern its everyday use of digital media.
Raley refers to Alan Liu’s 2011 MLA paper “Where is Cultural
Criticism in the Digital Humanities,” which underlines the need
to address digital media as a subject of critical discussion. In its
revised and expanded form for the first installment of the
Debates in the Digital Humanities, Liu writes: “While digital
humanists develop tools, data, and metadata critically […] rarely
do they extend their critique to the full register of society,
economics, politics, or culture. How the digital humanities
advances, channels, or resists today’s great postindustrial,
neoliberal, corporate, and global flows of information-cum-
capital is thus a question rarely heard in the digital humanities
associations, conferences, journals, and projects with which I
am familiar.” (491) As important as it may be to critique
resources, methods of mining and means of visualization, it is
hardly enough: “To be an equal partner—rather than, again, just
a servant—at the table, digital humanists will need to show that
thinking critically about metadata, for instance, scales into
thinking critically about the power, finance, and other
governance protocols of the world.” (495)
DHers could even assume a leadership position in the
humanities themselves, if only they incorporated cultural
criticism and deployed their innovative ways of communication
to fulfill the role of new “public intellectual[s]” (496). To this
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end, Liu recommends that digital humanities “enter into fuller
dialogue with the adjacent fields of new media studies and
media archaeology so as to extend reflection on core
instrumental technologies in cultural and historical directions.”
(501) Liu sides with Grusin’s rejection of the “invidious
distinction between making things and merely critiquing them”
and with the latter’s objection to Cathy Davidson’s ranking of
making over critiquing. In a tweet-response to Tara McPherson,
quoted by Grusin, Davidson writes: “Critique hard. New idea
much harder. Making stuff work really, really hard!” (2016, 499)
Of note is the fact that the mission statement of the initiative
4Humanities that Liu helped cofound in November 2010 reads:
“the digital humanities community […] woke up to its special
potential and responsibility to assist humanities advocacy.”
(490) As Liu now remarks, the past tense “woke” was
counterfactual, a “tactical lie in the service of hope” (491). That
Liu’s contribution to the first installment is a new wake-up call
might help explain the editor’s decision to place it at the end of
the book: a call that may remain unheeded, not (only) because
of the ‘neoliberal counterrevolution,’ but (also) because of the
burden of postmodern enlightenment.
End of Narratives
In his contribution to the collection Liu refers to his 2004 study
Laws of Cool: Knowledge Work and the Culture of
Information, which posits that those who are uneasy with the
new world order of “knowledge work” express their “paradoxical
conformance and resistance to that order through the subtle
ethos of ‘cool.’” He adds: “Digital humanists are not even cool”
(492). Since Liu defines the ethos of cool as “an ethos of
information that is against information, the uselessness of
useful information, the use of information to abuse information”
(184), one may wonder how cool in Liu’s sense “public
intellectuals” can be – given that the register of the
informational “cool” is  skepticism, relativism, and irony, rather
than the self-assured conviction of knowing right from wrong
that “public intellectuals” so often display. But regardless of how
much DHers aspire to the role of “public intellectuals,” they are
not un-cool because they refrain from subverting neoliberal
knowledge, but because they don’t renounce the pursuit of
objective, reliable knowledge.
It is the shock of self-mutilation that postmodern theories
elicited in the humanities, it is the “perceived lack of credibility,
if not obsolescence, of their metanarratives of legitimation” that
now compels certain parts of the humanities “[to] turn toward
the science” as Gary Hall suggests in his contribution to the first
installment (134). This turn, Hall insinuates, is an attempt by
humanists “to increase their connection to society and to
instrumentality and functionality” (134). The fundament for this
new connection, the mode of this “outreach” is building, not
destruction, as Cathy Davidson and David Theo Goldberg
famously point out in their 2004 paper Engaging the
Humanities: “What part of our inability to command attention
is rooted in humanists’ touting of critique rather than
contribution as the primary outcome of their work (i.e. not the
production of new knowledge but the questioning of the modes
of that production)? Is it not time we critique the mantra of
critique?” (45).
Such advice runs the risk of betraying the heritage of the
humanities. And it does so in two ways: first, by abstaining from
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the cultural critique towards digital that Liu, Raley, Grusin and
others ardently demand, and secondly, by forgetting the
fundamental vocation of the humanities, namely that of creating
a rhetoric of resistance not (only or primarily) towards
institutions but (also and moreover) toward meaning and Truth,
as German philosopher Odo Marquard explains in his 1986
essay On the inevitability of the humanities. To Marquard the
characteristic – and mission – of the humanities is to irritate the
business of understanding, to counterbalance the notion of
reliable and objective knowledge in the natural sciences. The
political importance of such a deconstructive endeavor becomes
clear, as Marquard holds, with respect to confessional civil wars,
which he terms ‘hermeneutic civil wars’: People kill one another
over the right interpretation of a book. What may sound
surprising and foreign today was well-known in the 1980s as the
“ethical turn” in narrative theory and moral philosophy – as in
when, for example, J. Hillis Miller in his programmatic 1986
book The Ethics of Reading praised deconstruction for
undermining the desire for totality and closure and for exposing
the rigidity and partiality of any (moral) perspective.
It is this “nihilistic vocation” of the humanities to “reveal the
world as a conflict of interpretations” to speak with Italian
philosopher Gianni Vattimo (40) that is at stake when the
humanities go digital. According to Johanna Drucker,
“disambiguation […] was the price of entry” (88); as she states
elsewhere: “we went through decades of deconstruction and
post-structuralism and seem to have forgotten all of the lessons
we learned as we (humanists) rush to uncritical engagement
with methods from other fields” (63). These methods “have been
absorbed from disciplines whose epistemological foundation
and fundamental values are at odds with, or even hostile to, the
humanities” (85f.) Drucker’s response is not a withdrawal from
the DH but the call to bring the values and meaning-making
strategies of the humanities into other realms of experience and
knowledge, as she and her co-authors do in the 2012 book
Digital_Humanities. This means incorporating the
“probabilistic rather than deterministic, performative rather
than declarative” methods of humanities into protocols for
information visualization, data mining, geospatial
representation, and other research instruments (86). In the
second installment of the collection such perspective is most
vividly echoed in Timothy Burke`s caveat to readers not to “view
human experience and human subjectivity as a managerial
problem,” holding that “every humanistic work or analysis
should produce an excess of perspectives, a variety of
interpretations […] dance away from pinning culture to the
social, to the functional, to the concrete” (515 and 517).
As for the issue of cultural critique, the other aspect of the
humanities’ heritage which DH risks betraying, it is
understandable that humanists who discussed the effects of
digital media on the human situation even before “humanities
computing” turned “digital humanities” (such as Grusin, Raley,
and Liu) should now be critical of humanists who apply digital
media without reference to such considerations. And it is
refreshing to see that in the second installment those calls for
cultural critique are taken up in papers such as Domenico
Fiormonte’s Toward a Cultural Critique of Digital Humanities
which reminds us, with McLuhan’s teacher and colleague
Harold Innis, of the bias of communication and illustrates it
with respect to the “cultural and political problem of software
and platform (e.g., social networks) almost exclusively produced
in the Anglo-American environment” (2016, 441).
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Other contributions to the second installment, such as Alien
Reading by Jeffrey M. Binder, point out the “ideological
assumptions that underlie the quantification of language” and
demand “thinking of text-mining programs as objects of cultural
criticism” (2016, 202). Such claims to reveal assumptions
behind interfaces, search engines and digital tools correct the
proposal to eventually neglect the tool, as Stephen Ramsay once
suggested: “algorithmic criticism looks forward not to the
widespread acknowledgement of its utility but to the day when
‘algorithmic criticism’ seems as odd a term as ‘library based
criticism.” For by then we will have understood computer based
criticism to be what it has always been: human-based criticism
with computers” (81). While such proposal displays modesty
toward the term one has coined oneself, and while it may be
appropriate to the extent that computer-free criticism and
interpretation are as much “deformance” and re-reading of a
text as “computationally enacted textual transformations” (2011,
38 and XI), it may send the wrong message regarding the bias of
our communication tools – a message that resurfaces when
Pannpacker states that “it won’t be long until the digital
humanities are, quite simply, ‘the humanities’ ” (233). There is a
crucial difference between a library offering a specific collection
of texts and an algorithm offering a specific reading of (those)
texts. The algorithm as a medium does not equal the library, nor
does it substitute it, but complements it and establishes (by
stepping between the given text and the reader) a very different
pre-condition of criticism which aptly is and always should be
identified as algorithmic.
From Underdog to Golden Retriever and
beyond
The abstinence from critique turns digital humanists into the
“golden retrievers of the academy,” Tom Scheinfeld notes, with
no clear signs of self-deprecation, in his contribution Why
Digital Humanities Is ‘Nice’ (59). The reasons are not simply
that collaboration forces people to get along or even the fact that
DH is still “young, small, vulnerable, and requiring of solidarity”
(59). To become a “nice” DHer, it already helps to be concerned
with method rather than theory, “because methodological
debates are often more easily resolved than theoretical ones,”
namely on practical grounds instead of ideological ones (59).
The shift “away from thinking big thoughts to forging new tools,
methods, materials, techniques,” as Scheinfeldt describes the
position of DHers in his contribution Sunset for Ideology,
Sunrise for Methodology? (125), goes a long way towards
earning that grant, at least in the eyes of the mighty
administrators who list access, production, and consumption as
the three pillars of DH.
In order to “become ‘dangerous’ again” David Greetham
suggests “textuits should embrace hermeneutics rather than
science,” i.e. they should not reduce their work to the production
of textual resources or statistics (439). The turn to robust,
credible, and declarative results, the desire for “textual
scholarship” to be “a ‘science,’ with demonstrable proofs,”
Greetham aptly points out, “only feeds the suspicions of some
humanities scholars that bibliographical and textual research
belongs in current humanities departments only as a ‘service’
activity, not full integrated in or related to the loftier
philosophical aspirations of postformalist humanities” (439).
The problem is not quantitative analysis, as Greetham
underlines with a nod to the Annales School, whose important
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contribution to historiography (the focus on social rather than
political themes) was partially based on quantitative methods
(448) – which, incidentally, is also why in the first installment
Liu deems the Annales movement an early adaptor of “distant
reading and quantitative methods” (503). The problem occurs if
numbers, patterns, and correlations revealed by algorithms are
not subjected to interpretation and debate. As Ramsay claims as
early as 2003: algorithmic criticism must not be conceived in
the “service of a heightened critical objectivity,” it must aim at
inspiration rather than confirmation, it should seek “not to
constrain meaning, but to guarantee its multiplicity” (167). In
other words, digital tools are supposed to allow humanists to ask
new questions rather than to answer old ones definitively.
Greetham’s recommendation that DHers become “dangerous”
again, by embracing hermeneutics and theory can be construed
as a response to what we called above the second betrayal of the
heritage of the humanities. An answer to the first betrayal (the
lack of cultural critique) would be sharing your insights on and
criticisms of new media with the wider public. Such sharing may
also be called “outreach” or “community commitment.” But it
should not be limited to the aspect of building, to which
Davidson and Goldberg seem partial, and which is well
illustrated by a collaborative project involving students, faculty,
and academic computing staff such as SmartChoice at Trinity
College in Hartford, which “empowers parents to navigate and
compare their growing number of public school options in
metropolitan Hartford” (Dougherty). Though SmartChoice is a
useful tool in the hands of the public and may indeed make “a
powerful argument for the value of liberal education and digital
humanities” (Alexander/Davis, 382), it does not contribute to a
more profound understanding of current political, social, and
cultural issues nor does it forge critical citizenship beyond the
‘critical’ decision about ‘what is best for my kids.”
The importance of projects aimed at such critical citizenship
becomes clear if one considers the neologisms digital media
generate to indicate their impact on society: multitasking, hyper
reading, power browsing, filter bubble, ambient intimacy,
ambient attention, sharing culture, self-tracking, dataveillence,
algorithmic regulation, FOMO (fear of missing out), etc. To
address these issues DHers may (alongside students and the
general public) develop projects that explore what insights
seemingly banal data on social media provide into a user’s
personality; investigate the logic of the algorithms that, at
Google, Facebook and elsewhere, determine what information is
fed back to users; illustrate the epistemic effect of digital media
when knowledge is crowdsourced vs. derived from experts, or
attained via search engines rather than by the ‘arduous’ effort of
reading books. In an age when computer technologies have such
“life-altering effects as extreme as, or even more extreme than,
some drugs” that some academics call for the FDA and FCC to
enforce democratic regulation and protections against the
domination of communication by private enterprise and
corporate interests, it is time that the humanities turn public
and help generate a media literacy that aims at more than the
effective, technically accurate and frictionless use of media.
Understanding Algorithms
Among the subjects most debated in the first installment were
issues such as what the DH is and what it is not, how much
programming DHers need to know, how digital works which are
vividly discussed by peers but do not end up in refereed
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publications can be appropriately credited towards tenure, to
what extent “building” (a website, a Gephi visualization, a tool
such as SmartChoice) should be seen as a scholarly activity (i.e.
whether coding constitutes theorizing). It does not come as a
surprise that many issues couldn’t be solved or that their
solutions only raised further questions. Take, for example, the
role of coding, to some as much a scholarly act as writing, which
in itself is not only the activity of presenting thoughts on the
subject at hand, but rather the act in which “thinking occur[s] in
the first place,” as Ramsey and Rockwell point out (82). Their
conclusion from this proposition seems very clear at first glance:
“If the quality of the interventions that occur as a result of
building are as interesting as those that are typically established
through writing, then that activity is, for all intents and
purposes, scholarship.” (83) What, the inevitable follow up
question would read, defines “interesting” in the context of
“building” and to what extent would it be the result of the
builder’s work? Are constellations and insights revealed by the
use of off the shelf apps for data mapping and visualization as
interesting as theories and theses created through the careful
narrating of data?
This and other questions are taken up in the second installment,
which proposes for example a “peer review system for tools”
(Swafford, 2016, 557) or prioritizes the knowledge of “what an
algorithm does” over “how it does it” and draws attention to the
understanding of “the transformations” or “reconfigurations
that an algorithm might effect” (Schmidt 2016, 546 and 547). As
“people design algorithms in order to automatically perform a
given transformation,” Benjamin M. Schmidt argues, “a
transformation expresses a coherent goal that can be
understood independently of the algorithm that produces it”
(ibid., 547). An example is “sortedness,” a result of algorithmic
operation and at the same time a general property one is able to
understand even if one does not understand the underlying
operations: “It would be ludicrous to suggest humanists need to
understand an algorithm like quicksort to use a sorted list. But
we do need to understand sortedness itself in order to make use
of the distinctive properties of a sorted list.” (Ibid.)
In contrast, other contributions exemplify how it is important to
know what the algorithms do in order to come to the correct
conclusions. Dennis Tenen imagines astronomers using a faulty
telescope that reveals extraordinarystar constellations: “To use
such tools well, we must, in some real sense, understand them
better than the tool maker,” Tenen states and adds: “The best
kind of tools are therefore the ones that we make ourselves.”
(2016, 84) This is, as Tenen continues, especially important if
tools such as Python’s Natural Language Toolkit contain an
“unsupervised method” (i.e. without any assumptions at the
outset) of finding groups of similar documents within a large
collection and if algorithms operate “nondeterministic,” i.e.
perform differently each time (ibid. 84f.).
A very inspiring contribution is David L. Hoover’s article
“Argument, Evidence, and the Limits of Digital Literary Studies”
which offers detailed and useful insights into the perils of word
counting. Referring to a discussion of gendered discourses of the
three female and three male characters in Virginia Woolf’s The
Waves Hoover argues that the counting of words can produce
very different results depending on which algorithm one
deploys, where the counting starts and what it includes. While,
for example, it seems plausible to treat a word with a genitive
apostrophe or a subsequent dash equally to its versions in
nominative and non-hyphenated forms (though not all
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programs do), things become more complicated if a male
character attributes words to his imaginary girlfriend (shall it
then still count as his “own” language?) and if one considers that
all female character monologues are significantly shorter than
those of their male counterparts. If the varying lengths are taken
into account (and there are different ways of doing so), the
number of exclusive mutual use of words (all three women share
14 words not used by any of the men, all three men share 90
words not used by any of the women) changes drastically (31
women-only versus 29 men-only words) and hence the division
of the characters along a gender axis (in the first counting by the
factor of 6.4285). Regardless of whether one thinks the
characters in The Waves are divided along a gender axis or are
more distinct line, Hoover’s article exposes the shaky ground on
which literary numerical analyses rest, concluding that “the fact
that a problem is computationally tractable does not mean that a
definitive or certain solution is necessarily possible” (233).
Taking Alan Sokal’s famous 1996 Social Text-hoax as an
example of the “all-too common lack of respect for argument
and evidence in literary studies” (2016, 230) Hoover stresses the
need to counter the damaged public perception of literary
studies via a shift to evidence-based methods. The author ends
his article with a methodical dispute of Stanley Fish’s blog post
“Mind Your P’s and B’s: The Digital Humanities and
Interpretation.” Polemically introducing his text as a
“conventional (i.e., non-digital) literary analysis that deals, as
the digital humanities do, with matters of statistical frequency
and pattern” (2013), Fish refers to a specific passage in
Areopagitica where Milton allegedly plays with the sounds of
the letters [b] and [p] in the words “Bishops” and “Presbyters.”
For Fish, that the phonetic level in Milton emulates the semantic
– i.e. that the presbyters who once suffered from the bishop’s
censorship have now themselves become the censors – can be
detected on naked eye. But Hoover disagrees and makes the
point that despite Fish’s objection to the methods of DH to first
“run the numbers” before coming up with an interpretative
hypothesis (ibid.), “a computational (and consistent) method of
counting [p] and [b] sounds in texts is entirely compatible with
Fish’s method and could help him persuade us that the pattern
might be intentional.” (2016, 247). Such computing, Hoover
adds, would have allowed Fish to see that other passages in
Milton’s text display similar proportions of words containing
[b]s and [p]s and that texts by Milton’s contemporaries contain
an even higher proportion of such words, ultimately
undermining Fish’s assumption that Milton intentionally uses a
high frequency of the two sounds to imply equivalency between
bishops and presbyters (ibid.).
Close/distant Reading
Fish takes his reading of Milton’s “dance of the ‘b’s’ and ‘p’s’ ”
(ibid.) as a starting point for a general discussion of the methods
of computational reading in the DH as put forward, for example,
in Matthew Wilkens’ essay “Canons, Close Reading, and the
Evolution of Method” contained in the first installment of the
Debates in the Digital Humanities. Downplaying the traditional
method of “close reading” in favor of “distant reading,” Wilkens
subscribes to Franco Moretti’s call for the ‘democratization’ of
literary studies by the inclusion of the extra-canonical into the
analysis of human history. In contrast to close reading, “a
theological exercise—very solemn treatment of very few texts
taken very seriously,” distant reading, Moretti holds, is exercised
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by algorithms and “allows you to focus on units that are much
smaller or much larger than the text: devices, themes, tropes—or
genres and systems” (57). Distant reading solves the problem of
textual abundance and limited reading speeds by undermining
the central virtue of literary studies: “what we really need is a
little pact with the devil: we know how to read texts, now let’s
learn how not to read them” (ibid.).
Such innovative methodological approaches have generated
neologisms such as “culturomics” which aims at the
“quantitative analysis of culture,” i.e. the application of “high-
turbo data analysis to questions in the humanities.” Wilkens
undertakes these “more inclusive or representative” (251)
analyses with regard to American fiction from the mid-
nineteenth century, counting the frequency with which
international locations appear in these texts. That the resulting
number is higher than expected seemingly indicates an
“outward looking” trend in American fiction from around 1850,
thus debunking the perception held thus far that these were
“strongly introspective” works (252). It is precisely this
conclusion that Fish questions: “Frequency is not an argument,”
he holds, demanding “contextual framings”: “If the international
place names are invoked by a narrator, it might be with the
intention not of embracing a cosmopolitan, outward
perspective, but of pushing it away: yes, I know that there is a
great big world out there, but I am going to focus on a landscape
more insular and American” (ibid.). According to Hoover, Fish
“righty points out” (2016, 243) that Wilkens falls short of the
task of subjecting the results to an assessment that even the
pioneers of such quantitative turn have declared indispensable:
“Culturomic results are a new type of evidence in the
humanities. As with fossils of ancient creatures, the challenge of
culturomics lies in the interpretation of this evidence” (Michel
and Aiden). In the case at hand, this interpretation requires a
return to close reading.
Disdain for close reading and a pact with the devil are what
prompt Fish’s indignation: That scholars of English, such as
Wilkens, don’t “actually read the books, before saying what the
patterns discovered in them mean” (ibid.). But in the case at
hand the accusation would appear hasty for in contrast to Fish’s
report, Wilkens does not dismiss close reading. In fact, he
states: “We may very well still need to read some of the texts
closely, but text-mining methods allow us to direct our scarce
attention to those materials in which we already have reason to
believe we will find relevant information.” (255) However
serious such calls for close reading may turn out to be, Fish is
correct in his assessment that Wilkens both represents a shift
away from “close reading alone” (ibid.) to other methods of
analyzing text and is willing to accept the negative consequences
of such shift – “we’ll almost certainly become worse close
readers” – as a trade-off “well worth making” (Wilkens, 256). In
the end, Wilkens holds that the outcome of the trade-off– “a few
more numbers in return for a bit less text” – “will almost
certainly be a net positive for the field” (ibid.) because it will
“result in categorically better, more broadly based, more
inclusive, and finally more useful humanities scholarship” (257).
Such assessment points to the aforementioned risk of betraying
heritage of the humanities: the “ethics of reading” and the
“meaning of hermeneutics,” as indispensable, socially
important, experiences of ambiguity and conflicting
interpretations. The capacity for such experiences is indeed at
risk if shift to distant reading turns us into deficient close
readers, more receptive to statistics than to the “multiplicity” of
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meaning that Ramsay proposes.
As Ramsay repeatedly points out, the shift to computation in
literary studies does not have to have such negative
ramifications. Hoover may be a good case in point for he
positions himself between Fish and Wilkens when he praises
close reading (2016, 244) and states that the power of the
computer to count, compare, collect is not simply an
endorsement of “ ‘distant’ kinds of readings of enormous
collections of text,” but can as well be used “to make our close
readings even closer and more persuasive.” (248) He does not
fail to underline that not only can digital methods provide “new
kinds of evidence in support of literary claims,” but “also make
some claims untenable” (ibid). We may add that sometimes
arguments – not as absurd as in the case of Alan Sokal’s hoax
but somewhat far-fetched as in the case of Stanley Fish’s reading
of Milton – could use more evidence and should, especially if
they are rationalized by lists, patterns, and frequency of words,
turn to computing for that very reason.
Moving On
More than the first volume, the 2016 volume discusses practical
and theoretical issues of the DH at the disciplinary level,
“exploring how their digital humanities work might speak to
their home disciplines or across several disciplines” (2016, XI),
and presents various DH projects. DH, this is the feeling the
reader gets, has moved on to base its identity on things built
rather than simply on arguments exchanged. This does not
mean, however, that there are no theoretical provocations and
straight declarations of values, as in the Forum Text Analysis at
Scale, which explores the historical and theoretical background
of “distant reading.” And of course, there is still much talk about
the “devastating effect of the neoliberal university and its
catastrophic legacy for the future” with special attention to the
new “academic precariat” (Grusin, 2016, 497; 498) and Daniel
Bell’s warning against technocrats in the humanities from his
1966 essay The Intellectual and the University (Raley, 2016,
507). However, this reference to a similar text from half a
century ago also puts concerns about the crisis of higher
education and the neoliberal takeover of its institutions into
perspective. If one rereads Thorstein Veblen’s 1918 essay The
Higher Learning in America one realizes that warnings about
“the intrusion of business principles in the universities” that go
“to weaken and retard the pursuit of learning, and therefore to
defeat the ends for which a university is maintained” are even
older than the presence of computers in any classroom (165).
There are, as N. Katherine Hayles notes elsewhere, “plenty of
problems facing the Digital Humanities: technical (e.g.,
distinguishing patterns from chimeras in data analysis); cultural
(e.g., defining significant problems rather than ones tailored to
chasing grants); economic (being coopted by corporate funding
to the extent that pedagogical and educational priorities are
undercut); and ethical (e.g., power relations between professors
and graduate students)” (270). However, a healthy position
regarding the proposed shift from analytical methods to an
experiential focus is Hayles’ conclusion that “the two approaches
(analytical vs. experiential) are complementary to one another
rather than antagonistic” and that “the antagonism between the
Traditional and Digital Humanities, understandable as it may
be, [is] also misplaced” (272).
The hope is that these two approaches can not only peacefully
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coexist (with all the institutional and financial support this
requires) but also collaborate (Galloway, 2006; Striphas, 2015;
Seyfert and Roberge; 2015). The hope is that “algorithmic
criticism” meet “algorithmic culture” and explore the behavioral
patterns and formulas brought about by digital media
themselves: from gaming, texting and searching to classifying,
filtering and sharing. One needs only consider the new ways of
self-presentation on social networks (implicit rather than
explicit, showing rather than describing) as well as established
theories of identity construction (via autobiographical
storytelling) to see how algorithmic analysis (of the hidden
narratives behind all the episodic elements users post on their
networks) allows the humanities to have new media as their
subject and use it as their tool too. Hence, the hope is to find
many of such DH projects in the next installation of Gold’s,
Klein’s and whoever else takes up the honorable task of
editorship of Debates in the Digital Humanities.
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